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Abstract
This paper investigates the quantitative importance of diﬀerent savings motives on the distributions of
wealth and consumption and aggregate capital accumulation by solving an overlapping generations model
with intragenerational heterogeneity. Agents diﬀer in age, ability, earnings shocks, and inherited bequests.
In the baseline economy, there are uninsurable idiosyncratic risks associated with uncertain lifetime and
earnings shocks. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and solved numerically. Then the allocations
of the baseline economy are compared with those of an economy with complete annuity markets, one without
earnings uncertainty, and one without altruism.
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People save from various motives. Facing hump-shaped age-earnings proﬁles and retirement from work later in
life, they save in order to smooth consumption over time (the life-cycle motive of savings). In the environment
where future earnings are uncertain and insurance markets are incomplete, they accumulate wealth in order to
self-insure against such uncertainty (the precautionary motive of savings). Further, individuals save in order
to leave bequests to their children because of the utility from such behaviors (the altruistic motive of savings).
Due to uncertain lifetime and the incompleteness of annuity markets, portions of wealth intended for their own
consumption are left as bequests (accidental bequests).1
Savings thus motivated determine individual wealth accumulation over lifetime, the distributions of wealth
and consumption across heterogeneous people, and aggregate capital accumulation. How important are the
above savings motives to people of diﬀerent characteristics, and how do they inﬂuence the distributions and the
aggregate wealth?
The question is important by itself, but it is even more so because of policy implications associated with it.
Eﬀects of policies that redistribute resources among people of diﬀerent characteristics, such as public transfer
programs, public health insurance, and social security, are critically dependent on the relative importance of
diﬀerent savings motives. For example, if savings of young individuals are largely motivated by precautions
rather than by life-cycle concerns, policies that deliver income insurance would decrease their savings. As a
result, wealth inequality between young and old generations might increase and total capital accumulation
would decrease. Alternatively, if the life-cycle motive is strong among them, wealth inequality and capital
accumulation would be insensitive to such policies.
Many empirical studies have tackled a part of the question, the relative importance of diﬀerent savings
motives in aggregate wealth accumulation, by disentangling wealth accumulated for the purpose of intergen-
erational transfers from wealth generated from the life-cycle motive. These studies can be divided into two
groups, those that follow an accounting approach and those that employ a direct questionnaire approach. The
accounting-based approach estimates wealth accumulated from life-cycle concerns as the accumulated net sur-
plus of earnings over consumption (and the rest is wealth for transfers). In this branch of literature, there
are papers by Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981), Ando and Kennickell (1987), Kotlikoﬀ (1988), and Modigliani
(1988). The direct approach uses surveys asking people what shares of their wealth are held for the purpose of
intergenerational transfers (Modigliani, 1988 and Hurd and Mundaca, 1989).
Although these studies provide valuable information for resolving the question, there exist caveats associated
with them. Firstly, the estimates do not separate wealth accumulated from diﬀerent motives at a fundamental
level. The calculation of life-cycle wealth does not distinguish the precautionary motive from the pure life-cycle
motive. Estimated transferred wealth of the accounting-based approach includes both accidental and altruis-
tically motivated transfers, while, in the direct approach, accidental transfers are included in life-cycle wealth.
1Intergenerational transfers might be caused by diﬀerent motivations. For example, Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981) assume that
parents transfer resources to children in return for old age support. This type of transfer motive is not considered in the paper.
1Secondly, diﬀerent types of savings do interact, hence it is very diﬃcult to isolate each motive as the above em-
pirical studies have attempted (Kessler and Masson, 1989). Receiving a bequest increases resources available for
consumption as well as for transfers and thus aﬀects life-cycle savings. However, the deﬁnition of the life-cycle
wealth of the accounting-based approach implicitly assumes that such bequest is not used for consumption, as
long as the life-cycle wealth is non-negative, overestimating wealth accumulated for transfers. The deceased
would obtain some utility from leaving their children wealth not accumulated for altruistic concerns, hence
reasonable estimates of altruistically motivated transfers may not be obtained based on the direct question-
naire approach. Finally, these estimates are not useful in examining the relative importance of diﬀerent savings
motives after some policies are altered. For example, the relative importance of intergenerational transfers in
wealth accumulation will be aﬀected by policy changes such as increased social security beneﬁts that reduce
life-cycle savings.2
Recognizing the limitations of the existing empirical studies, we take a complementary simulation-based
approach in tackling the question. Numerical simulations are based on a realistic overlapping generations model
with intra-generational heterogeneity. In the model, an individual is born into a parent with certain levels
of assets and earnings. During childhood, the individual does not make any choices and just inherits and
acquires ability. Once he becomes an adult, he starts working and then has a child. He receives labor and
capital incomes and allocates them to current consumption and savings. The individual’s earnings depend on
his ability determined before entering the labor market, his age, and a stochastic shock. Accumulated wealth
comes from cumulative savings and a bequest received from his parent. After a particular age, he retires and
starts to face a probability of death, and once he dies he leaves wealth to his child as a bequest, from which
he derives utility.3 Inter vivos transfers are not modeled for technical diﬃculties. In the baseline economy,
insurance markets are non-existent and loan markets are not available (credit constraint). Savings are the only
way to self-insure against the risks associated with uncertain lifetime and the earning shocks.
The parameters of the baseline economy are chosen so that the evolution of individual earnings over time,
the intergenerational correlation of earnings, and the distributions of earnings and wealth of the simulated
economy match those observed for the U.S. economy reasonably well. The model succeeds not only in matching
the overall distributions of earnings and wealth but also in reproducing the distributions for subgroups of the
population.
Then, the allocation of the baseline economy is compared with those of three hypothetical economies: one
with a complete annuity market, one without labor earnings uncertainty, and one without altruism. In this way,
eﬀects of various savings motives on distributions of wealth and consumption and aggregate wealth accumulation
2There are other problems with the empirical studies. As for the accounting-based approach, the estimates are sensitive to
a variety of assumptions concerning the age of family formation, the age of retirement, and the age of death; the shape and
stability over time of age-earnings and age-consumption proﬁles, and of relative wages; and the deﬁnition of durable goods as
consumption or investment (Blinder, 1988). The direct questionnaire approach, on the other hand, relies on potentially highly
inaccurate information from respondents.
3That is, altruism is of an ’impure’ (a ’warm glow’) type as in the models by Yaari (1965) and Blinder (1973). Pure altruism,
where an individual cares about the utility of his child (as in Barro, 1974 and Becker, 1974), is not assumed in the paper. Pure
altruism brings strategic interactions across generations in a realistic overlapping generations model as the one in the present paper,
and would lead to multiple competitive equilibria as well as signiﬁcantly increase computational burdens. See footnote 7 too.
2are indirectly investigated. The reason for the indirect examination is, as noted above, it would be infeasible to
isolate the eﬀect of each of the motives in any model or data set due to interactions among diﬀerent motives.
Existing related simulation-based studies include Masson (1986), Caballero (1991), and Lord and Rangazas
(1991). They employ partial-equilibrium OLG models without intra-generational heterogeneity and focus on
eﬀects of subsets of the above-mentioned savings motives on aggregate capital accumulation. More recently,
Hendricks (2002) examines the quantitative importance of accidental versus intended bequests using a dynamic
general equilibrium model and claims that accidental bequests explain at least half of bequests in the U.S.
economy.4 The present model is more realistic in its structure and tackles broader questions, that is, eﬀects on
the distributions of wealth and consumption as well as on aggregate capital accumulation and bequests.5
This work is also closely related to the research that searches for models that can quantitatively reproduce
actual wealth distributions, such as Huggett (1996), Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), Gokhale et al. (2001),
Laitner (2001), Nishiyama (2002), Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003), and De Nardi (2004). In
terms of the model structure, most closely related is De Nardi (2004), which also employs a general equilibrium
OLG model with ’impure’ (’warm glow’) altruism and examines the importance of various forms of intergenera-
tional links, that is, accidental bequests, altruism, and intergenerational correlations of earnings, in generating a
realistic wealth distribution. She ﬁnds that the model with ’impure’ altruism can generate a large concentration
of wealth in the very rich observed in data, while the one without altruism cannot.
Further, this paper is somewhat related to the research on consumption and savings behaviors that use
numerical methods, which includes Deaton (1991, 1992), Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994, 1995), Caroll
(1997), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Cagetti (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. The baseline model, which is supposed to reﬂect the actual U.S. economy,
is described in Section 2 and the competitive equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned in Section 3. Section 4
presents two hypothetical economies where complete insurance markets for lifetime uncertainty are available
and earnings uncertainty is nonexistent, respectively. Section 5 describes detailed procedures to calibrate the
baseline model to the U.S. economy, and Section 6 presents and explains results of numerical simulations.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Economic Environment
In this section, the baseline model that is calibrated to the U.S. economy in numerical examinations is presented.
The underlying economic environment is a discrete-time overlapping generations world. In this economy, an
4Hendricks calibrates the model without any altruism to the U.S. economy and obtains the ﬁnding. He also considers the model
where a portion of individuals do not have any altruism and the rest have perfect altruism. (See footnote 7 for a brief account of
the model with perfect altruism.) Whether an individual becomes altruistic or not is determined stochastically and independently
of his parent’s type. By comparing the average amount of bequests of altruistic individuals with that of non-altruistic individuals,
he concludes that 47 % of bequests are accidental while the rest are intended.
5Although not the main objective of the paper, Nishiyama (2002) (see footnote 7 for a brief description of the model) examines
eﬀects of introducing complete annuity markets to his baseline economy on variables such as aggregate capital and the distribution
of wealth.
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Figure 1: Generational Structure
individual’s life is divided into three parts, childhood, adulthood before retirement, and adulthood after retire-
ment.
During childhood an individual makes no economic decisions, hence age is counted only for adulthood in
the model. It is assumed that 1 period corresponds to 5 years and an individual lives up to 12 periods. This
period setting is made for easing computational burdens.
An adult before retirement, who is between age 0 (age 25–29 in real life) and age 6 (age 55–59 in real
life), is called a young adult. A young adult receives labor and capital incomes, a lump-sum transfer from the
government, and a bequest upon his parent’s death, if any, and makes decisions on consumption and assets
holdings for the next period. He has a child at age 1 (age 30–34). His parent, who is 6 periods older than him,
leaves him assets at death as a bequest, because of the joy of giving and uncertain lifetime. He supplies a ﬁxed
amount of time (normalized to 1) for work each period. Earnings depend on his ability settled before becoming
an adult, his age (work experience), and a stochastic shock, which reﬂects all the stochastic changes in earnings
during the working period. During this period, the agent faces two types of risks, labor earnings uncertainty
and uncertainty about his parent’s living status.
When turning age 7 (age 60–64 in real life), he retires and starts to face a positive probability of death
for each year (including age 7) of his remaining life. An adult after retirement is called an old adult. He
receives capital income and social security beneﬁts, and makes decisions on consumption and asset holding for
the next period. His social security receipt depends on the average earnings during his working period, which
is a good approximation of the current U.S. social security system. After age 11 (age 80–84 in real life) he dies
for certain. Figure 1 presents the generational structure of the model. The following subsections describe the
model in detail.
42.1 Generational Structure
As explained above, an individual’s adult life starts at age 0 and may last up to age 11. Since age 7, that is,
after retirement, he faces a positive probability of death. His parent is 6 periods older and his child is 6 periods
younger than him. In this setting only two generations coexist as living adults within a lineage, which simpliﬁes
the analysis.6 The number of deaths and births in the economy is assumed to be the same each period so that
the population of the economy is constant over time. The probability of being alive at age j +1 conditional on
surviving up to age j is denoted by pj, with pj = 1; for j = 0;1; ¢¢¢ ;5 ; pj 2 (0;1) for j = 6;7; ¢¢¢ ;10; and
p11 = 0.
2.2 Consumer’s Maximization Problem
An individual derives utility from the ﬂow of his consumption when alive and from a bequest transferred to
his child upon his death. Note that he cares about the bequest left to his child, but not about his child’s
consumption. That is, he has ‘impure altruism’. As mentioned in the introduction, if the individual is assumed
to care about the consumption of his child, and the both agents maximize their utilities as diﬀerent economic
units, strategic interactions across generations would arise in the model. This would increase the complexity
of the analysis signiﬁcantly, hence this simpler assumption is adopted.7 Let cj and aj be his consumption and
assets at age j. Denote his momentary utility function from consumption by U (¢) and the one from bequest by

























The expectation operator E0 is attached to the above expression to indicate that as of period zero there exist
risks other than the one associated with uncertain lifetime (mentioned below). An individual survives until age
j ¡1 with probability Π
j¡2
k=0pk. With probability pj¡1, he survives the next period and obtains the utility from
consumption cj: With probability 1 ¡ pj¡1; he dies before becoming age j and obtains utility from leaving a
bequest aj. After age 11, he dies with certainty and obtains utility from bequest a12.
6If the generational structure allows for the coexistence of three generations as adults, diﬀerent types of bequests (from a
grandparent to a grandchild, or from a parent to a child and a grandparent) could arise and complicates the analysis considerably
without changing the model’s implications much.
7One of the models considered in Hendricks (2002) assumes perfect altruism. However, he imposes unrealistic assumptions on
informational structures in order to avoid computational diﬃculties associated with strategic interactions between a parent and
his child. That is, a parent is assumed not to know anything about his child’s states and the child at the beginning of life learns
exactly how much he will inherit from the parent and can borrow the present value of the future inheritance. Hence, if the child
receives a large amount of bequest in future, he faces a very weak borrowing constraint and consequently accumulates little wealth.
Laitner (2002) also constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with perfect altruism. In his model, an individual does not
face temporary earnings shocks, has access to actuarially fair annuities and life insurance (hence only intended bequests exist),
and makes inter vivos transfers to his child until the child’s borrowing constraint is lifted and saves the remaining transfers for his
bequest. This setting allows the model to be solved numerically. Nishiyama (2002) also considers a model with perfect altruism.
The setting of the model is more realistic than the above two papers and hence strategic interactions arise between a parent and
his children. The computational diﬃculty is resolved by assuming that an individual lives for four periods at most and his earnings
ability is not correlated with that of his parent.
5Assume that functions U (¢) and F (¢) are strictly increasing and strictly concave. Further assume that
limc!0 U0 (c) = 1 and limb!0 F0 (b) < · < 1; where · is a positive real number. The latter assumption is
imposed in order to allow zero bequests for a portion of the population.
The individual chooses consumption and assets plans in order to maximize his expected utility subject to
the following constraints:
(1 + ¿c)cj + aj+1 = (1 ¡ ¿l)wlj + [1 + (1 ¡ ¿k)r]aj + tr; for j = 0;1;¢¢¢ ;6; (2)
if the parent is alive or died by the previous period,
(1 + ¿c)cj + aj+1 = (1 ¡ ¿l)wlj + [1 + (1 ¡ ¿k)r](aj + bj) + tr; for j = 1;¢¢¢ ;6; (3)
if the parent has just died,
(1 + ¿c)cj + aj+1 = socj + [1 + (1 ¡ ¿k)r]aj; for j = 7;8;¢¢¢ ;11; (4)
and aj+1 ¸0; for j = 0;1;¢¢¢ ;11; (5)
where aj+1 represents the asset holding at age j + 1 and bj is the bequest received from his parent at age j, if
any. Further, r; w; and lj are the interest rate, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor, and the eﬀective labor
supply at age j, respectively. Finally, ¿c;¿l; and ¿k are tax rates on consumption, labor income and capital
income, respectively; tr is a lump-sum transfer received during his working periods; and socj denotes his social
security receipt at age j. He faces a borrowing constraint each period so that he has to keep non-negative assets
each period, which also implies that he cannot leave a negative bequest to his child.8
Since an individual may receive a bequest upon his parent’s death, he needs to form an expectation on his
future bequest receipt to solve the maximization problem. Assume that he has full access to the necessary
information to predict his future bequest accurately, that is, the information needed to solve the parent’s
maximization problem after retirement (death can occur only after retirement). In order to simplify numerical
computations, it is further assumed that the young individual solves his decision problem after observing his
parent’s current decisions.
2.3 Earnings Process
The agent’s eﬀective labor supply lj depends on his inherited and acquired ability before becoming an adult
(earnings ability), his age (work experience), and a stochastic shock (earnings shock). Assume the following
functional form for the eﬀective labor supply:
lj = µÁ(j)´j; (6)
where µ is the earnings ability, Á(j) is an age-dependent deterministic component, and ´j is the earnings shock.
8There is a large literature on endogenous borrowing constraints, but due to computational complication, the simpler exogenous
constraint is assumed.
6The earnings ability, µ, captures all abilities inherited or acquired before becoming an adult, which would
depend on his innate ability, nurture, education, and family and environments he grew up in, although none of
these dependencies are explicitly modeled. µ is time-invariant throughout an individual’s life, but it is correlated
with his parent’s earnings ability and follows the following stochastic process:
lnµ = ½lnµp + ²; ² » N(0;¾2
"); i.i.d, (7)
where µp is the earnings ability of his parent and ² is a stochastic shock to the process, which follows an i.i.d.
normal distribution.9
The time-varying earnings shock, ´j, captures all the shocks to earnings after an individual starts working,
which would include changes in his employment status, his job performance, health condition, the performance
of the company he works for, etc. The shock is assumed to follow the following AR(1) process in logs,
ln´j = ³ ln´j¡1 + Àj; Àj » N(0;¾2
º); i.i.d, (8)
where ´j¡1 is the earnings ability in the previous period (at age j ¡ 1) and Àj is a stochastic shock to the
process, which follows an i.i.d. normal distribution.
2.4 Recursive Formulation
The above maximization problem is reformulated in a recursive way so that decision problems and state variables
at every stage of life are stated clearly. This recursive formulation is used for solving the model numerically.
2.4.1 Young Adult’s Problem I (While his parent is alive)
A young adult, who is between age 0 and age 5 and has a living parent, earns labor and capital incomes, and
may receive a bequest next period if his parent dies. His dynamic programming problem at age j (0 · j · 5)
reads as follows,
9Since decisions on human capital investment are not explicitly modeled, the above process captures all the sources of the
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and S0 =Ψ(S): (16)
In equation (9), V j¡
µ;´;l;a;sp;S
¢









are the next period’s welfare when his parent is alive and dies, respectively; ¯ is the
discount factor on future utilities; pj+6 is the conditional probability that his age j +6 parent survives the next
period; and E is the expectation operator conditional on the information available in the current period. In
the budget constraint (10), c is consumption, l is eﬀective labor supply, a is assets (variables with superscript
’0’ denote variables for the next period). The wage rate per eﬀective labor supply is denoted by w and the
interest rate is denoted by r. Tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income are expressed by ¿c;
¿l, and ¿k, respectively; and tr is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The eﬀective labor supply l is
dependent on the time-invariant earnings ability µ, the age-dependent deterministic component Á(j), and the
stochastic component ´, which follows an AR(1) process in logs (equations 11 and 13). The average eﬀective
labor supply up to this period, l, is a component of his state vector because the future social security beneﬁt
is dependent on it. A vector of state variables for his parent, sp, is needed to predict his bequest receipt (the
exact component of the vector is explained below) and the transition function for this vector is denoted Υ(¢)
(equation 15). Vector S represents the aggregate state of the world and Ψ(¢) characterizes the evolution of the
aggregate state (equation 16).
2.4.2 Young Adult’s Problem II (After his parent dies)















subject to (1 + ¿c)c + a0 = (1 ¡ ¿l)wl + [1 + (1 ¡ ¿k)r](a + b) + tr; (18)
and equations (11);(12);(13);(14);and (16):




is his welfare in the next period and b is the bequest received
from his parent, which depends on his parent’s state sp. Since the young adult is assumed to have enough
information to know his parent’s states after retirement, b coincides with the parent’s optimal asset holding at
age j + 6 (determined at age j + 5) when the parental state is sp.














subject to equations (10);(11);(12);(13);(14);and (16):
2.4.3 Maximization Problem at Age 6
In the next period (at age 7), he becomes a retiree, starts receiving a social security payment and facing a
positive probability of death. By this age his parent is dead with certainty (see Figure 1), and now he has to
care about the event of his child inheriting his assets.











+ (1 ¡ p6)F(a0)
¤o
; (20)
subject to equations (10), (11), (14), and (16), where p6 is the agent’s conditional probability of surviving the
next period, J7¡
l;a0;S0¢
is the welfare at age 7 if he is still alive, and F(a0) is the utility associated with leaving
bequest a0 if he dies. Note that function J7 does not depend on µ and ´ anymore.











+ (1 ¡ p6)F(a0)
¤o
; (21)
subject to equations (18), (11), (14), and (16).
2.4.4 Old Adult’s Problem
After retirement, the individual receives social security beneﬁts, and faces a positive probability of death. An











+ (1 ¡ pj)F(a0)
¤o
; (22)
subject to (1 + ¿c)c + a0 = soc(wl) + [1 + (1 ¡ ¿k)r]a; (23)
and equations (14) and (16):
In the above formulation, Jj+1¡
l;a0;S0¢
is the welfare in the next period when he is still alive and soc(wl)
denotes his social security receipt, which depends on his average earnings during his working life, wl. Note that
9the individual dies before becoming age 12 with probability 1, so that p11 = 0:
From the formulation of the maximization problem, it is now clear that the vector of parental state variables
needed for a child to predict the bequest from his parent is sp = (jp;l
p
;ap0); where jp, l
p
, and ap0 are the
age, the lifetime average eﬀective labor supply, and the next period’s assets of his parent, respectively. The
variable ap0 is the current state variable because the child makes decisions after observing his parent’s decisions
by assumption.
2.5 Final Goods Production




O(k;l) ¡ wl ¡ (r + ±)k
ª
; (24)
where O(¢) denotes the CRS ﬁnal good production function, k and l denote aggregate capital and eﬃciency
labor, respectively, and ± is the depreciation rate of physical capital. From the ﬁrst-order conditions the real
interest rate and the wage rate are expressed as functions of the capital-eﬃciency labor ratio.
2.6 Governmental Policies
The government taxes labor income, capital income, and consumption to ﬁnance the lump-sum transfer, social
security, and the non-transfer policy, which is the consumption of the ﬁnal good by the government and is
assumed not to aﬀect individuals’ utilities. The government’s budget constraint reads
tr + soc + cg = ¿lwl + ¿krk + ¿cc; (25)
where tr is the total lump-sum transfer, soc is the total social security payment, and cg is the consumption of
the ﬁnal good by the government.
3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The analyses in later sections focus on a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium where decision problems
are recursive, and the aggregate state of the world and governmental policies are time-invariant. The followings
are deﬁnitions of a recursive competitive equilibrium and of a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium.
























































































(iii) price functions w and r,
(iv) governmental policies ¿l, ¿k, ¿c, tr, soc(wl), and cg,







(vi) the law of motion for the aggregate state of the world S ´ SV £ Se V £ SW £ SJ, Ψ, where SV is the joint
distribution of j;µ;´;l;a; and s
p for young adults with alive parents; Se V is that of the same variables for young adults
who have just lost their parents; SW is the joint distribution of j;µ;´;l; and a for young adults whose parents died by the
previous period; and SJ is the joint distribution of j;l; and a for old adults,
such that
1. An age j (0 · j · 5) young adult with a living parent solves problem (9), with the maximized value function given
by V





2. An age j (1 · j · 6) young adult who have just lost his parent solves problem (17), with the maximized value
function given by e V
j and the decision rules by A
j
e V and C
j
e V (when he is age 6, he solves problem 21);
3. An age j (2 · j · 6) young adult whose parent died by the previous period solves problem (19), with the maximized
value function given by W




W (when he is age 6, he solves problem 20);
4. An age j (7 · j · 11) old adult solves problem (22), with the maximized value function given by J
j and the































A young adult’s prediction of the future bequest in state s
p is also determined by (27);
6. The ﬁrm solves problem (24), with the ﬁrst-order conditions given by r = O1(k;l) ¡ ± and w = O2(k;l); where k












µÁ(j)´ ¢ d (SV £ Se V £ SW)
i
; (30)
7. The government’s budget constraint is satisﬁed, i.e.
11tr + soc + cg = ¿cc + ¿lwl + ¿krk; (31)







































8. The law of motion of the aggregate state of the world is consistent with the individual decisions, the ﬁrm’s choices,
and the governmental policies, and evolves according to
S
0 = Ψ(S);
Deﬁnition 2 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a recursive competitive equilibrium in which S =
Ψ(S) and the governmental policies are time-invariant.
4 Completing Markets
In the baseline economy described above, an individual self-insures against earnings and lifetime uncertainties
by accumulating wealth for a precautionary reason. When there are markets to insure against these risks,
precautionary savings and accidental bequests disappear. In order to examine changes in the distribution
of wealth and aggregate capital accumulation in the presence of such insurance markets, two hypothetical
economies, the one with complete annuity markets, and the one without earnings uncertainty, are constructed
in this section.
4.1 Economy with Complete Annuity Markets
Suppose that there are complete annuity markets so that an individual can insure against his uncertain time of
death. Let 1+r
pj¡1 units of consumption of the next period be the gross return of one unit of the annuity security
if the individual survives and nothing otherwise.10 Let aI denote the amount of assets that is annuitized. Then,
at any point in time, if he were to die, the non-annuitized portion of his assets, a0, will be bequeathed to his
child, while the annuitized portion, aI, will go to ﬁnance insurance claims of survivors.
Then the budget constraints of an individual over age 6 become
(1 + ¿c)c + a0 + a0
I = (1 ¡ ¿l)wl + [1 + (1 ¡ ¿k)r]a + tr; for j = 6; (35)
(1 + ¿c)c + a0 + a0






aI; for j = 7;:::;10; (36)






aI; for j = 11: (37)
10In this way the relative price of this security in terms of consumption is 1. Clearly there are other equivalent ways to set up
this market where the relative price is not one.
12The return of the annuity is higher than normal assets due to pj¡1 < 1. Hence, in the absence of altruism, the
individual will hold all of his assets in the annuitized form.
4.2 Economy with No Earnings Uncertainty
In addition to annuity markets being incomplete, the baseline model has also assumed the absence of markets
in which consumers can purchase insurance against earnings uncertainty. In order to set up complete insurance
markets for the earnings uncertainty, one could introduce contingent claims. However, due to computational
diﬃculties we take a shortcut by considering the model economy where the earnings shock ´ always takes a
common value. The constant value of ´ is set so that the aggregate eﬃciency labor of this economy is at the
same level as in the original economy.11
5 Calibration
In this section, the model’s functional forms are speciﬁed and parameter values are set for numerical simulations.
The parameters are set based on existing empirical works, if available. Otherwise, they are set so that the
simulated economy produces statistics that resemble those of the U.S. economy when policy parameters are set
based on actual policies.
5.1 Final Good Production and Preferences
Final good production function: The function is assumed to be of the standard Cobb-Douglas type:
O(k;l) = k®l1¡®: (38)
The parameter ® is set to 0:36, following most works in quantitative macroeconomics.
Depreciation rate for physical capital ±: The annual rate of depreciation is usually set between 0:08 and 0:10
in the quantitative business cycle literature. Choosing the midpoint of these estimates and noting that each
period in the model corresponds to 5 years in real life, the depreciation rate for numerical simulations is set to
be 1 ¡ (0:91)5.




; ¾ > 1: (39)







; ¾ > 1: (40)
11Recall that the complete market economy will not be Pareto optimum due to distortionary taxation and the existence of the
borrowing constraint. Therefore, solving the planner’s problem will not deliver the market allocation.
13The presence of 1 in the above expression permits some individuals to leave no bequests.
Preference parameters ¾; b1 and b2; and the discount factor on future utilities ¯ are set so that the simulated
model economy delivers a good overall match of the U.S. wealth distribution. The parameter values chosen for
simulations are presented in the next section, when simulation results of the baseline model are discussed.
5.2 Earnings Process
Remember that the eﬀective labor supply of an individual at age j is given by the following function,
l = µÁ(j)´; (41)
where µ is the earnings ability (time-invariant), Á(j) is the deterministic component at age j, and ´ is the
time-variant stochastic component (earnings shock). The earnings shock ´ follows
ln´0 = ³ ln´ + À0; À0 » N(0;¾2
º); i.i.d. (42)
The earnings ability µ is correlated across generations in the following manner,
lnµ = ½lnµp + ²; ² » N(0;¾2
"); i.i.d., (43)
where µp is the earnings ability of his parent.
The age-dependent deterministic component Á(j) is speciﬁed based on the empirical estimates by French
(1999). He uses the PSID and the PSID validation study for the years 1978–1987 to estimate the stochastic
process of labor earnings. His estimate of the deterministic component is
Á(j) = 0:18 + j £ 0:099 ¡ j2 £ 0:0015 + j3 £ 0:85 £ 10¡5 ¡ j4 £ 0:11 £ 10¡7: (44)
The AR processes for the innate ability and for the earnings ability are discretized based on the Tauchen
(1986)’s procedure. The parameters ½, ¾2
º , ³ and ¾2
" are diﬃcult to set based on the existing empirical
work, hence they are pinned down so that the simulated model produces the distribution of earnings and
intergenerational correlations of earnings close enough to the corresponding statistics of the U.S. economy. The
chosen parameter values are presented in the next section.
5.3 Survival Probabilities
The survival probabilities are taken from the 1985 Vital Statistics of the Life Tables for Health Statistics (1999)
of the U.S. population. Since an individual lives until turning age 7 (age 60–64 in real life) with certainty and
dies with probability 1 after age 11 (age 80–84 in real life) in the model, the conditional survival probabilities
are adjusted accordingly.
145.4 Governmental Policies
Recall that the government collects its revenue by levying taxes on labor income, capital income, and consump-
tion. The tax revenues are then used to ﬁnance lump-sum transfer, social security system, and the non-transfer
policy, which is the governmental consumption of the ﬁnal good and is assumed not to aﬀect individuals’ utilities.
The government’s budget constraint reads
tr + soc + cg = ¿cc + ¿lwl + ¿krk; (45)
where tr is the total lump-sum transfer, soc is the total social security payment, cg is the spending on the
non-transfer policy, and ¿c;¿l; and ¿k are tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income.
Social Security System: The social security payment is based on average life-time labor earnings wl. There-
fore, agents with diﬀerent earnings histories receive diﬀerent amounts of social security beneﬁts. Assume that
the social security beneﬁt of an old adult is determined by the following function:
soc(wl) = &w l: (46)
The parameter & is set to be 0:4: Then a retired worker gets 40% of the average of his lifetime labor earnings,
which is close to the value (42%) people with average earnings would receive in the U.S. economy, according to
the information of the Social Security Administration. However, the actual social security system is progressive,
so that people with higher earnings receive less than proportionally. In order to take into account this feature
of the actual system, the computed average lifetime eﬀective labor supply l is adjusted accordingly.12
Tax rates: The tax rates on labor income ¿l, capital income ¿k, and consumption ¿c are set to be equal to
0:2887, 0:398, and 0:0523, respectively, following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), who computed eﬀective
tax rates on factor incomes and consumption using national accounts and revenue statistics. The values are the
averages of their estimates for the years 1980-1999.
Lump-sum transfer: The value of the lump-sum transfer to the working population tr is chosen so that
the ratio of the transfer to GDP in the baseline economy becomes 0:031, which is the average of the ratios in
the U.S. economy for the years 1980-1999. The U.S. transfers used to compute the ratios are sums of all the
non-educational governmental transfers excluding social security, Medicare, and retirement beneﬁts.
12 In particular, l is adjusted so that workers in particular positions of the earnings distribution receive the same proportions
of their average lifetime earnings as they would when they retire before age 62 in the U.S. economy. The targeted workers are
those who receive earnings at the national average level, 45% of the average earnings, and 160% of the average earnings steadily
throughout their lives. These particular workers are chosen since their beneﬁts examples are found in a document of the social
security administration. The referred U.S. replacement ratios are the averages of the ratios for the years 1990-99.
156 Results
6.1 Baseline Model
In this subsection, the calibration procedures for the unset parameters of the earnings process and preferences
are explained and the chosen parameter values are presented. Then simulation results of the baseline economy
are presented and compared with the data of the U.S. economy.
6.1.1 Earnings Distribution
The parameters of the earnings process are chosen so that the distribution of earnings and the evolution of
earnings across time and generations are reasonably close to those observed for the U.S. economy. In particular,
attention is paid to the following statistics- (i) the ’static’ earnings distribution: the Gini coeﬃcient, the
proportion of the population without earnings, shares of earnings held by particular percentiles, the ratio of
earnings of the highest 1% to the lowest 40% of the distribution,13 and the mean to median ratio; (ii) its
transition over time and across generations: the 5 year correlation of log earnings for an individual14 and the
intergenerational correlation of the log of life-time earnings; and (iii) the distributions for skilled and unskilled
workers: the Ginis for college and non-college graduates15 and the earnings ratio of college to non-college
graduates. Table 1 presents the chosen parameter values.




0.4 0.392 0.7 0.303
Table 2 presents the statistics of the earnings distribution of the baseline economy and of the U.S. economy.
The statistics of the static U.S. earnings distribution are from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997),
who used the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1992 as the data source. The proportion of the U.S.
population without earnings is computed as the sum of the proportions with zero and negative earnings in the
data, which are 24% and 0.42%, respectively. The range of values of the intergenerational correlation of lifetime
earnings is based on Mulligan (1997), Solon (1992), and Zimmerman (1992). College graduates in the model
are deﬁned as those who are in the top 27% of the distribution of earnings ability µ. This value is the observed
percentage of college graduates in the data used in Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997).
It should be stressed that, with these few parameters, the overall shape, the shape for each education group,
and the transitions of the earnings distribution are matched satisfactorily. The match is not so successful for
the extreme upper tail of the distribution and the proportion of the population without earnings. In the model
the upper tail has lower concentration than in the data, and the proportion of the population without earnings
13This is the ratio of average earnings that an individual in the highest 1% of the distribution would receive to average earnings
that an individual in the lowest 40% would.
14Remember that 1 period in the model corresponds to 5 years.
15Actually, the Gini for people without college education is not available in the data. However, the Ginis for those with high
school education and without high school education are available, the numbers being 0.554 and 0.733, respectively.
16Table 2: Earnings Distribution [Baseline]
Baseline U.S. economy
Gini coeﬃcient 0:632 0:628
People without earnings 30:45% 24:42%
Share of earnings held by
Top 1% 10:26% 14:76%
Top 5% 29:19% 31:13%
Top 10% 43:34% 43:51%
Top 20% 63:2% 61:39%
Top 40% 85:38% 84:72%
Top 60% 97:19% 97:21%
Ratio of highest 1% to lowest 40% 146 211
Mean/Median 1:77 1:65
5 year correlation of log earnings 0:720 (n/a)
Intergenerational correlation of
log-lifetime earnings 0:448 0:32 ¡ 0:54
Gini for college graduates 0:593 0:564
Gini for non-college graduates 0:576 (n/a)
Earnings ratio of college to non-college 2:71 2:72
is higher than observed. In the model, everyone retires when turning age 7 (age 60-64 in real life), but many
retire at older ages in the actual economy, which would be a reason for this result.16 Since the U.S. statistic for
the 5 year correlation of log earnings is not available, in a later section, the sensitivity of results is checked by
performing experiments with diﬀerent values for the correlation coeﬃcient of the earnings shock process, ³.
6.1.2 Wealth and Bequests Distributions
The preference parameters ¯, ¾, b1, and b2 are of fundamental importance in determining the shape of the
simulated wealth (assets) distribution. They are set so that the simulated economy matches the U.S. wealth
distribution in (i) its overall distribution: the Gini, the proportion of people without wealth, shares of wealth
held by particular percentiles, the ratio of wealth of the highest 1% to the lowest 40% of the distribution, and
the mean to median ratio; (ii) its distribution within the working and retired population: the Gini and the
proportion of people without assets for each group; and (iii) the distributions among college and non-college
graduates: the Gini for each group. Table 3 shows the chosen parameter values.17
Table 3: Preference Parameters
¯ ¾ b1 b2
(0:96)5 4:0 ¡0:175 19:0
Table 4-I presents the statistics of the wealth distributions of the baseline economy and of the U.S. economy.
16Another possible reason for the discrepancy would be that the basic economic unit in the data is a household that includes a
person or a couple who live together and all other ﬁnancially dependent individuals who live in the same household. As a result,
there are cases where the head of the household is retired but other individuals in the same household are still in the labor force.
17The value of b1 is negative so that the marginal utility from leaving a bequest becomes positive. (Note that ¾ is greater than
one.)
17Table 4: Wealth and Bequests Distributions [Baseline]
Baseline U.S. economy
I. Wealth Distribution
Gini coeﬃcient 0:781 0:781
People without wealth 20:71% 6:9%
Share of wealth held by
Top 1% 24:17% 29:55%
Top 5% 49:78% 53:50%
Top 10% 64:34% 66:12%
Top 20% 80:22% 79:49%
Top 40% 94:47% 92:92%
Top 60% 99:2% 98:64%
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 1207 875
Mean/Median 4:134 3:61
Gini for working population 0:799 (n/a)
Workers without wealth 24:83% (n/a)
Gini for retired population 0:738 0:725
Retired people without wealth 11:3% (n/a)
Gini for college graduates 0:736 0:764
Gini for non-college graduates 0:741 0:734=0:752
II. Bequests Distribution
Gini coeﬃcient 0:829 (n/a)
People without bequests 37:11% (n/a)
The statistics for the U.S. wealth distribution are from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997).18
The simulated economy delivers a tight match to the U.S. wealth distribution. In particular, the Gini
coeﬃcient for the whole population, the shares of wealth held by the top 10, 20, and 40% of the distribution,
and the Gini for non-college graduates are almost identical to the corresponding values of the U.S. data. On the
other hand, the proportion of the whole population without wealth is much lower than the corresponding U.S.
statistic. The discrepancy is not so serious as the number suggests, since about 24% of the population in the U.S.
data hold ’almost’ zero wealth.19 The higher proportion of non-wealth population reﬂects the higher proportion
of the population without earnings and the absence of inter-vivos transfers, which lowers asset holdings by the
working population, in the model. The share of wealth held by top 1% is also lower in the model economy,
reﬂecting the thinner right tail of the earnings distribution.
Figure 2 (left) displays the age-wealth proﬁles for average individuals in the top 20%, middle 40%, and
bottom 40% of the earnings ability (µ) distribution.20 They may be considered as the proﬁles of diﬀerent
education groups.
18The presented U.S. statistic for the proportion of the population without wealth is the sum of the proportions of individuals
with zero wealth (3.4%) and of those with negative wealth (3.5%). The presented Gini for retirees in the U.S economy is the Gini
for individuals aged above 65. The Gini for those aged between 61 and 65 is 0.744. The corresponding U.S. statistic for the Gini
for non-college graduates is the Gini for high school graduates (0.734) and for those without high school education (0.752).
19To be more accurate, in the histogram of the wealth distribution presented in Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997),
about 24% of the sample belongs to the same interval as individuals without wealth.
20Wealth at each age is the average of wealth holdings at the beginning and at the end of the period.
18Figure 2: Age-Wealth (left) and Age-Bequests (right) Proﬁles [Baseline]




















































Individuals before middle age hold limited amounts of assets. However, they steadily increase wealth holdings
over time primary because more of them receive bequests from their parents. This can been seen clearly from
Figure 2 (right), which plots age against average inherited bequests.21 The bequests receipts increase with age
until age 3 (age 40–44 in real life), then slightly decrease. By comparing the graphs of wealth and bequests, it
seems that, before age 3, wealth is accumulated mainly through bequests receipts. Far from the retirement age
and expecting future earnings to increase, individuals do not have any motives to save except for precautionary
reasons, unless they have received large amounts of bequests: They would want to borrow in the absence
of the borrowing constraint.22 At around age 3 (age 40–44), they seem to start preparing for retirement by
accumulating more wealth, and at age 6 or 7 (age 55–59 or age 60-64), depending on their earnings abilities,
their asset holdings are at the peaks, which is consistent with the data.23 After retirement at age 7, they start
depleting accumulated assets for consumption. People in the low and middle earnings ability groups deplete
most of their assets by age 11 (age 80-84), which indicates that most of bequests are left by those in the high
ability group. This is reﬂected in Table 4-II for the bequests distribution, where the Gini coeﬃcient and the
percentage of the population without bequests are much higher than the corresponding values for wealth of
retirees in Table 4-I.24
21The averages are taken for all individuals in a cohort including those whose parents do not die at that age.
22The values of discount factor ¯ in Table 3 and the after-tax interest rate in Table 6 suggest that individuals are impatient in
the sense that the optimal consumption proﬁle under certainty is downward sloping, although the degree of impatience is weak:
c0
c = 0:986 under certainty.
23According to the data used in Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997), the average wealth held by a household is at the
peak when the head of a household is between age 56 and age 60.
24The percentage of the population without bequests seems reasonable. McGarry (1999) ﬁnds that the average reported prob-
ability of leaving inheritance greater than $10,000 is 0.55 among respondents with at least one non-coresident adult child in the
Assets and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD) surveyed in 1992 and 1993.
19Table 5: Consumption Distribution [Baseline]
Baseline
Gini 0.400
Variance of log consumption 0:464
Gini for working population 0:399
Gini for retired population 0:399
Figure 3: Age-Consumption Proﬁle [Baseline]




























Table 5 shows the statistics for the consumption distribution. The consumption inequality is much lower than
the earnings and wealth inequalities. The variance of log consumption for the whole population is equal to
0.464, which is close to the U.S. values (between 0.4 and 0.47) reported in Deaton and Paxon (1994), who used
the 1980-1990 versions of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
Figure 3 displays the age-consumption proﬁles. The proﬁles reproduce the empirically observed humped
shape. When individuals are very young, their proﬁles are steep, reﬂecting earnings growth and the borrowing
constraint, but gradually become ﬂatter with the relaxation of the constraint through wealth accumulation.
The peaks of their consumption levels are at age 4 (age 45–49 in real life) or age 5 (age 50–54) depending on
the earnings abilities, which are earlier than the peaks of wealth accumulation. This matches the U.S. value
(around age 50–55) reported in Caggetti (2000), who used the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the
years 1980–1995. After the peaks, consumption levels steadily decrease with age, reﬂecting impatience (a low
value of the discount factor ¯) and a rising death probability.
6.1.4 Aggregate Variables and Prices
Finally, Table 6 shows the statistics of the aggregate variables and the prices. The U.S. ratio of the government
revenues to GDP is computed from Tables 1.1 and 3.1 of National Income and Product Accounts Tables by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (2001),25 and the U.S. ratio of Social Security
expenditures to GDP is taken from Appendix F of The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2002-2011
by Congressional Budget Oﬃce.26 The ratio of bequests to capital of the U.S. economy is based on the estimates
25The number is the average of the current government revenues as percentage of GDP for the years 1980 - 1999.
26The number is the sum of Social Security, Medicare, and other federal retirement and disability programs’ expenses as a
percentage of GDP for the years 1980-1999.
20by Gale and Scholz (1994) for the year 1986.27 The U.S. interest rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity
rate minus the CPI growth rate averaged over the years 1980-1999.
Table 6: Aggregate Variables and Prices [Baseline]
Baseline U.S. Economy
Aggregate Variables
Soc. Sec./GDP 9:34% 7:5%
Gov. Rev./GDP 27:82% 27:98%
Bequests/Capital 9:32% 7:05 ¡ 8:5%
Prices
Yearly interest rate 4:95% 4:35%
After-tax yearly interest rate 2:98% 2:62%
The aggregate variables and the prices get close to the data in like manner. The higher ratio of social
security beneﬁts to GDP may be explained by the higher proportion of retired people in the model economy
due to the mandatory retirement at age 7 (age 60-64 in real life).
6.2 Complete Annuity Markets
Now the statistics of the baseline economy are contrasted with the hypothetical economies to see how market in-
completeness and altruism aﬀect the distributions of wealth and consumption, and overall capital accumulation.
In this subsection, comparison is made with the economy in which annuity markets are completed.
Table 7-I presents the statistics for the wealth distribution of this economy in comparison to those of the
baseline economy. The Gini coeﬃcients for the whole population, for each age group, and for each education
group all increase signiﬁcantly. The hikes are caused by the concentration of wealth in very rich households,
as can been seen from the massive increases in the share of wealth held by the top 1% of the distribution and
the ratio of wealth held by the top 1% to that held by the bottom 40% of the distribution. In contrast, the
proportions of people without wealth for the whole population and for each age group increase more modestly.28
Figure 4 shows the age-wealth proﬁles for people who are in the top 20%, middle 40%, and bottom 40% of
the earnings ability (µ) distribution. The proﬁles before retirement (age 7) have similar shapes to those of the
baseline economy, although wealth accumulated before retirement is slightly lower than in the baseline economy.
This suggests that, at this stage, savings are mostly motivated by precautionary concerns or preparation for
income decrease after retirement. A notable diﬀerence is observed for the proﬁles after retirement; now they
deplete their assets more slowly and therefore hold larger assets until their death. In the baseline economy,
where there is no insurance for uncertain lifetime, people tend to spend their incomes for consumption while
27The higher value is the proportion of total intergenerational transfers in net worth and the lower value is the proportion after
excluding college expenses by parents. Original values are adjusted for the model’s assumption that 1 period corresponds to 5
years.
28Nishiyama (2002) also examines the eﬀects of introducing complete annuity markets in a diﬀerent setting. His ﬁnding is
qualitatively similar, but not quantitatively: the magnitude of the eﬀects is much smaller. For example, the Gini of the distribution
of wealth increases by mere 0.01.
21Table 7: Distributional Statistics [Complete Annuity]
Annuity Baseline
I. Wealth Distribution
Gini coeﬃcient 0:827 0:781
People without wealth 23:98% 20:71%
Share of wealth held by
Top 1% 33:80% 24:17%
Top 5% 59:68% 49:78%
Top 10% 71:95% 64:34%
Top 20% 84:94% 80:22%
Top 40% 95:96% 94:47%
Top 60% 99:53% 99:2%
Mean/Median 6:29 4:13
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 2894 1207
Gini for working population 0:841 0:799
Workers without wealth 28:41% 24:83%
Gini for retired population 0:786 0:738
Retired people without wealth 13:82% 11:3%
Gini for college graduates 0:778 0:736
Gini for non-college graduates 0:802 0:741
II. Bequests Distribution
Gini 0:862 0:829
People without bequests 36:93% 37:11%
III. Consumption Distribution
Gini 0:418 0:400
Variance of log consumption 0:492 0:464
Gini for working population 0:415 0:399
Gini for retired population 0:426 0:399
Figure 4: Age-Wealth Proﬁle [Complete Annuity]




















Figure 5: Age-Consumption Proﬁle [Complete Annuity]


























22Table 8: Aggregate Variables and Prices [Complete Annuity]
Annuity Baseline
Aggregate Variables
Capital relative to Baseline 0:921 1:00
Bequests relative to Baseline 0:675 1:00
Soc. Sec./GDP 9:33% 9:34%
Gov. Rev./GDP 28:21% 27:82%
Bequests/Capital 0:0683 0:0932
Prices
Yearly interest rate 5:45% 4:95%
After-tax yearly interest rate 3:28% 2:98%
their death probabilities are relatively small, because they face the risk of leaving wealth not intended for
their children at death. Now that they are insured against such events, they can smooth consumption after
retirement. The age-consumption proﬁles (Figure 5) show clearly the eﬀect of the presence of annuity markets
on consumption smoothing after retirement. Demands for annuities are large indeed: the fraction of assets
annuitized is almost close to 1 for those in the bottom 60% of the distribution of earnings ability (when they
have positive wealth). By contrast, the fraction of annuitized assets is lower (about 0.74) for those in the top
10% of the distribution. As a result, the Gini coeﬃcient of the bequests distribution is much higher than in the
baseline economy (Table 7-II). This would be the main reason of the higher concentration of wealth in the rich
population and the increase in no-wealth individuals observed in Table 7-I.
The availability of annuities aﬀects consumption distribution through various channels. The higher wealth
and bequests inequality tend to exacerbate consumption inequality, while the smoother after-retirement con-
sumption path leads to an improved consumption distribution across age and the higher annuity demands by
poor individuals tend to diminish inequality among diﬀerent income groups. Table 7-III shows that the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates and consumption inequality goes up compared to the baseline economy.
Finally, Table 8 presents aggregate variables and prices. The equilibrium yearly before-tax interest rate
increases to 5:45% from 4:95% of the baseline economy, which corresponds to a 7:9% decrease in aggregate
capital.29 The lack of accidental bequests causes this drop. Aggregate bequests show a much bigger 32:5%
decline, and as a result, the ratio of bequests to total capital drops from 0.0932 to 0.0683.
6.3 No Earnings Shock
In this experiment, earnings uncertainty is removed by assigning the same value of the earnings shock ´ to all
the individuals. The value of the common ´ is set so that the aggregate eﬃciency labor in the economy is at the
same level as in the baseline economy. This economy can be considered to approximate a hypothetical economy
where complete insurance for earnings uncertainty is available.
29Nishiyama (2002) ﬁnds that the introduction of complete annuity markets increases the interest rate by 0:5% and reduces
aggregate capital by 6:2%, similar to the present ﬁnding.
23Table 9: Earnings Distribution [No Earnings Uncertainty]
No Earnings Shock Baseline
Gini coeﬃcient 0:563 0:632
Share of earnings held by
Top 1% 6:84% 10:26%
Top 5% 23:72% 29:19%
Top 10% 37:35% 43:34%
Top 20% 55:25% 63:2%
Top 40% 80:91% 85:38%
Top 60% 95:08% 97:19%
Ratio of highest 1% to lowest 40% 55:63 146:1
Mean/Median 1:34 1:77
Gini for log-lifetime earnings 0:334 0:400
Gini for college graduates 0:509 0:593
Gini for non-college graduates 0:482 0:576
Earnings ratio of college to non-college 2:72 2:71
Figure 6: Age-Wealth Proﬁle
[No Earnings Uncertainty]





















Figure 7: Age-Consumption Proﬁle
[No Earnings Uncertainty]


























As Table 9 shows, the earnings inequality decreases considerably compared with the baseline economy in
almost all the dimensions; in particular, a drop of the Gini for log-lifetime earnings is worth mentioning. The
exception is the earnings ratio of college graduates to the rest of the population, which is expected since the
distribution of the earnings ability µ is kept constant.
This large decrease in earnings inequality translates into a large decline in wealth inequality, as can be seen
in Table 10-I. However, the eﬀect on the working population and on the retired population are diﬀerent. The
Gini for the working population decreases only slightly and the proportion of individuals without wealth in
this group increases greatly, while both the Gini and the proportion of non-wealth individuals for the retired
population decrease signiﬁcantly. Removal of earnings uncertainty implies more equalized lifetime earnings, and
thus less unequal life-cycle savings among middle age individuals in preparation for retirement, but it also leads
24Table 10: Distributional Statistics [No Earnings Uncertainty]
No Earnings Shock Baseline
I. Wealth Distribution
Gini coeﬃcient 0:747 0:781
People without wealth 26:57% 20:71%
Share of wealth held by
Top 1% 24:9% 24:17%
Top 5% 45:63% 49:78%
Top 10% 59:43% 64:34%
Top 20% 75:54% 80:22%
Top 40% 92:34% 94:47%
Top 60% 99:06% 99:2%
Mean/Median 2:75 4:13
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 1065 1207
Gini for working population 0:788 0:799
Workers without wealth 37:55% 24:83%
Gini for retired population 0:651 0:738
Retired people without wealth 1:44% 11:3%
Gini for college graduates 0:701 0:736
Gini for non-college graduates 0:703 0:741
II. Bequests Distribution
Gini 0:778 0:829
People without bequests 26:06% 37:11%
III. Consumption Distribution
Gini 0:353 0:400
Variance of log consumption 0:339 0:464
Gini for working population 0:350 0:399
Gini for retired population 0:360 0:399
to much smaller precautionary savings by young adults, which leads to the higher number of non-wealth young
adults. The two opposing eﬀects yield the smaller decline of the Gini for the working population. In contrast,
for retirees, the equalized lifetime earnings distribution and the resulting more equal social security beneﬁts
both contribute to lower wealth inequality. The changes in the bequests distribution reﬂect those of the wealth
distribution of retirees, as shown in Table 10-II.
The age-wealth proﬁles (Figure 6) exhibit much lower wealth accumulation before middle age due to the
much weaker precautionary savings motives. After around age 4 (age 45–49 in real life), the shapes of the
proﬁles look very similar to the baseline economy, thus other savings motives seem to be dominant.
The consumption distribution improves greatly as well (Table 10-III). The equalized lifetime earnings and
bequests tend to alleviate consumption inequality among people with diﬀerent abilities or bequests receipts,
while lower precautionary savings tend to ameliorate the consumption distribution between age groups. The
shapes of the age-consumption proﬁles (Figure 7) show a noticeable diﬀerence in consumption behaviors after
age 3, in particular for the rich. In the baseline economy, after the peaks around age 4 or 5, consumption
steadily decreases with age. In contrast, in this economy, consumption is almost constant between age 3 and 7.
25Table 11: Aggregate Variables and Prices [No Earnings Uncertainty]
No Earnings Shock Baseline
Aggregate Variables
Capital relative to Baseline 0:933 1:00
Bequests relative to Baseline 1:00 1:00
Soc. Sec./GDP 8:65% 9:34%
Gov. Rev./GDP 28:16% 27:82%
Bequests/Capital 0:1004 0:0932
Prices
Yearly interest rate 5:41% 4:95%
After-tax yearly interest rate 3:26% 2:98%
Due to the disappearance of the earnings uncertainty, the consumption proﬁles become closer to the ones under
certainty, which are almost ﬂat when savings are positive (see also footnote 22).
Aggregate variables and prices are shown in Table 11. The yearly before-tax interest rate increases to 5.41%,
which implies that aggregate capital decreases by 6:7% in comparison to the baseline economy. The eﬀect of
fully insuring earnings uncertainty on aggregate capital accumulation is a little weaker than the eﬀect of fully
insuring lifetime uncertainty. The diﬀerences of the eﬀects are more striking in bequests, now aggregate bequests
are almost the same as in the baseline economy. While the lack of earnings uncertainty reduces precautionary
savings greatly, the resulting decrease in the inequality of lifetime earnings makes it possible for more people to
leave bequests. These two eﬀects on aggregate bequests seem to cancel out each other.
6.4 No Altruism
Finally, the eﬀect of altruism on savings and consumption decisions are investigated by simulating the hypo-
thetical economy where people do not obtain utilities from leaving bequests. This case diﬀers from the baseline
economy only in the absence of the bequest utility function, F(b0). Accidental bequests are transferred to heirs
as before.
Table 12-I shows the statistics for the wealth distribution of this economy in comparison to those for the
baseline economy. Inequality declines in all the dimensions. In particular, concentration of wealth in the far right
tail of the distribution and the inequality of wealth among the retired population decrease greatly, reﬂecting the
disappearance of altruism. In contrast, improvement of the wealth distribution among the working population
is more modest. In particular, the proportion of the working population without wealth is hardly aﬀected.
Figure 8 (left) presents the age-wealth proﬁles for people who are in the top 20%, middle 40%, and bottom
40% of the earnings ability (µ) distribution. For those in the low and middle ability groups, the shapes of
the proﬁles are very similar to those for the baseline economy, suggesting again that altruistically-motivated
savings have limited importance for them. But for those in the highest ability group, large diﬀerences are
observed. First, the amount of assets accumulated at the peak (age 7) is much lower than that of the baseline
26Table 12: Distributional Statistics [No Altruism]
No Altruism Baseline
I. Wealth Distribution
Gini coeﬃcient 0:728 0:781
People without wealth 19:79% 20:71%
Share of wealth held by
Top 1% 14:39% 24:17%
Top 5% 38:47% 49:78%
Top 10% 55:01% 64:34%
Top 20% 74:51% 80:22%
Top 40% 92:66% 94:47%
Top 60% 98:86% 99:2%
Mean/Median 3:32 4:13
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 505:2 1207
Gini for working population 0:761 0:799
Workers without wealth 24:16% 24:83%
Gini for retired population 0:653 0:738
Retired people without wealth 9:81% 11:3%
Gini for college graduates 0:670 0:736
Gini for non-college graduates 0:697 0:741
II. Bequests Distribution
Gini 0:748 0:829
People without bequests 34:55% 37:11%
III. Consumption Distribution
Gini 0:394 0:400
Variance of log consumption 0:463 0:464
Gini for working population 0:395 0:399
Gini for retired population 0:388 0:399
Figure 8: Age-Wealth (left) and Age-Bequests (right) Proﬁles [No Altruism]
















































27Figure 9: Age-Consumption Proﬁle [No Altruism]


























economy. Further, they deplete their wealth holdings much more rapidly after the peak, and at age 11 the
diﬀerences in wealth holdings among diﬀerent skill groups become very small. In this economy, people are
concerned only about their own consumption. While death probabilities are small, they keep large wealth
for future consumption, but as the death probabilities increase with age, they decrease their assets holdings
rapidly. This is the reason why the proﬁle is much steeper for rich people after retirement, and wealth is much
less concentrated in the rich.
Figure 8 (right) shows the age-bequests receipts proﬁles for young adults. Now all the bequests are accidental
rather than altruistically motivated. The biggest diﬀerence from the baseline economy is the huge drop in the
amount of bequests received after age 3. As they get older, death probabilities of their parents become higher,
and as a result, the parents reduce their assets holdings, resulting in smaller bequests. At age 6 nobody receives
any bequests since the parent is at age 11 and is going to die for certain. Table 12-II shows the distribution
of bequests. The Gini coeﬃcient is much lower than the baseline economy and the proportion of population
without leaving bequests is a little lower.
The lower wealth inequality also translates into lower consumption inequality, as observed in Table 12-III,
but the decrease is very small, especially for the working population and for the whole population. More equal
bequests receipts tend to equalize the consumption distribution among the young, while the disappearance of
altruism allows richer people to consumer more, and the result suggests that the two eﬀects nearly cancel out
each other. Figure 9 shows that the age-consumption proﬁle for people with high earnings ability is much
steeper after retirement compared to the baseline economy, reﬂecting the rapid depletion of wealth holdings
seen in the age-wealth proﬁle (Figure 8, left).
Finally, Table 13 presents aggregate variables and prices. The equilibrium yearly before-tax interest rate
increases to 6.48% from 4.95%, associated with a 20.4% decrease in aggregate capital. The disappearance of
altruism in this economy also results in a 33.3% decrease in aggregate bequests.
28Table 13: Aggregate Variables and Prices [No Altruism]
No Altruism Baseline
Aggregate Variables
Capital relative to Baseline 0:796 1:00
Bequests relative to Baseline 0:667 1:00
Soc. Sec./GDP 9:35% 9:34%
Gov. Rev./GDP 29:0% 27:82%
Bequests/Capital 0:0781 0:0932
Prices
Yearly interest rate 6:48% 4:95%
After-tax yearly interest rate 3:90% 2:98%
6.5 Robustness
The above results have been based on the calibration where the correlation coeﬃcient of the AR(1) process for
the earnings shock, ³, is set 0:4 and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ¾ is 4:0. Although this calibration
has produced good matches of the model economy to the U.S. economy, there are no U.S. statistics that directly
pin down the values of these two parameters. Since they are crucial in determining the relative strength of the
precautionary motive of savings, this section checks robustness of the results by choosing diﬀerent values for
the two parameters and recalibrating the model accordingly.
6.5.1 Comparisons of Baseline Economies under Diﬀerent Parameterization
Table 14: Calibrated Bequest Parameters
¾ = 3:0 ¾ = 4:0 ¾ = 5:0
³ = 0:3 b1 = ¡0:4 b1 = ¡0:215 b1 = ¡0:17
¾2
" = 0:4079 b2 = 24 b2 = 21 b2 = 18
³ = 0:4 b1 = ¡0:365 b1 = ¡0:175 b1 = ¡0:15
¾2
" = 0:392 b2 = 18 b2 = 19 b2 = 17
³ = 0:5 b1 = ¡0:28 b1 = ¡0:16 b1 = ¡0:14
¾2
" = 0:3704 b2 = 17 b2 = 14 b2 = 13
Table 15: Earnings Distribution when ³ = 0:3;0:4; and 0:5
³ = 0:3 ³ = 0:4 ³ = 0:5
¾2
" 0:4079 0:392 0:3704
Gini of lifetime earnings 0:394 0:400 0:406
5 year correlation of log earnings 0:682 0:720 0:758
Intergenerational corr. of
log-lifetime earnings 0:462 0:448 0:432
The procedure of the recalibration is as follows. For parameter ³; three diﬀerent values 0:3;0:4; and 0:5
are tried. Given ³, the variance of the disturbance term to the earnings shock process, ¾2
", is adjusted so that
29Table 16: Distributional and Aggregate Statistics (exc. Earnings) for diﬀerent ³s when ¾ = 4:0
³ = 0:3 ³ = 0:4 ³ = 0:5
Share of wealth held by top 1% 24:32% 24:17% 22:85%
Wealth ratio of top 1% to bottom 40% 1092:4 1206:9 1613:8
Wealth Gini for working population 0:799 0:799 0:802
Workers without wealth 23:29% 24:83% 26:89%
Wealth Gini for retired population 0:740 0:738 0:734
Retired people without wealth 10:32% 11:3% 13:59%
Bequests Gini 0:830 0:829 0:821
Consumption Gini 0:393 0:400 0:405
Bequests/Capital 0:0962 0:0932 0:0907
Table 17: Distributional and Aggregate Statistics (exc. Earnings) for diﬀerent ¾s when ³ = 0:4
¾ = 3:0 ¾ = 4:0 ¾ = 5:0
Share of wealth held by top 5% 48:39% 49:78% 50:66%
Wealth ratio of top 1% to bottom 40% 1755:5 1206:9 893:4
Wealth Gini for working population 0:803 0:799 0:796
Workers without wealth 30:02% 24:83% 23:76%
Wealth Gini for retired population 0:730 0:738 0:746
Retired people without wealth 12:48% 11:3% 9:97%
Bequests Gini 0:825 0:829 0:831
Consumption Gini 0:408 0:400 0:388
Bequests/Capital 0:0884 0:0932 0:0965
the cross-sectional distribution of earnings remains unchanged. As for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
¾, three values 3:0;4:0; and 5:0 are tried. For a given value of ¾, the parameters of the bequest function b1
and b2 are adjusted so that the baseline model under the new parameterization yields the same Gini coeﬃcient
for the wealth distribution of the whole population. Note that this does not mean that other dimensions of
the wealth distribution remain unchanged with the new parameters. Table 14 shows the chosen values of the
bequest parameters for 9 combinations of ³ and ¾; including the original parameterization, ³ = 0:4 and ¾ = 4:0.
Table 15 presents selected statistics of the earnings distributions when the correlation coeﬃcient of the
earnings shock process, ³, is set 0:3;0:4; and 0:5. Since the unconditional distribution of the earnings shock is
kept constant, the distributions of earnings for the whole population and for each skill group do not change.
In contrast, the distribution of lifetime earnings becomes more unequal with larger ³, since the earnings shock
at age 0, which is drawn from the same unconditional distribution, becomes more crucial in determining the
shocks at later ages. Obviously the period-by-period correlation of log earnings rises and the intergenerational
correlation of log-lifetime earnings falls with higher ³.
Selected statistics of the distributions of wealth, bequests, and consumption for diﬀerent values of ³ when
¾ = 4:0 are summarized in Table 16. Similar qualitative results are found for ¾ = 3:0 and 5:0 as well. Other
things being equal, higher persistence of the earnings shocks (larger ³) increases inequalities of lifetime earnings
and thus life-cycle savings and decreases precautionary savings by the young, contributing to higher overall
30wealth inequality.30 Thus, in order to keep the Gini for the whole population constant, when ³ is higher, the
altruistic motive of savings must be weakened by lowering absolute values of bequest parameters b1 and b2.
Higher ³ and lower jb1j and b2 result in higher wealth inequality among the working population and lower
inequality among the retired population. The lower values of the bequest parameters also decrease the ratio
of aggregate bequests to aggregate capital. The consumption distribution worsens slightly due to the higher
inequality in lifetime earnings and the weaker altruism.
Table 17 shows selected statistics of the distributions of wealth, bequests, and consumption for diﬀerent
values of ¾ when ³ is set 0:4. Qualitative results remain unchanged when ³ = 0:3 and 0:5. Other things
being equal, the higher value for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion raises precautionary savings and thus
reduces wealth inequality among the working population. The higher ¾ also implies a lower rate of intertemporal
substitution and hence a ﬂatter age-consumption proﬁle, increasing life-cycle savings for post-retirement periods
and savings for bequests.31 Since these motives are stronger among the rich due to the progressive social security
system and the form of the bequests function, the higher ¾ tends to worsen wealth inequality, in particular,
among retirees. It turns out that the overall eﬀect of the higher ¾ results in the higher Gini for the whole
population, thus the bequest parameters b1 and b2 must be lowered in absolute values. Because of the stronger
precautionary motives, proportions of the population without wealth decrease. The ratio of bequests to capital
increases due to greater life-cycle savings.
6.5.2 Robustness of Results on Distributions
Changes in the distributions of wealth, bequests, and consumption in the three hypothetical economies in
comparison to the baseline economy are qualitatively the same in almost all the dimensions under all the
parameterization. Quantitatively, as detailed below, diﬀerences in the rates of change are observed.
Economy with complete annuity markets: In all the nine cases, almost all the measures of inequalities worsen
compared to the baseline economy. When the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ¾ is higher, rates of increase in
wealth and bequests inequalities become smaller. On the other hand, raising the correlation coeﬃcient of the
earnings shock process ³ has mostly ambiguous eﬀects on rates of change of the distributional measures.
Economy without earnings uncertainty: In the economy without earnings uncertainty, the proportion of
households without wealth goes up except for the retired population, and all the other inequality measures fall
for all the parameter combinations. When ¾ is higher, rates of decrease of the inequality measures become
smaller except proportions of individuals without wealth. In contrast, increasing ³ raises rates of decrease of
the inequality measures aside from proportions of people without wealth (except for the retired population),
whose rates of increase fall.
Economy without altruism: In all the cases, wealth and bequests inequalities decline compared to the baseline
30Precautionary savings are relatively more important among the poor, who leave limited bequests and receive social security
beneﬁts more than proportional to earnings (See footnote 12). Thus weaker precautionary motives raise wealth inequality between
income groups as well as age groups.
31As explained in footnote 22, the optimal age-consumption proﬁle under certainty is slightly downward sloping.
31Table 18: Capital and Bequests [Complete Annuity]
¾ = 3:0 ¾ = 4:0 ¾ = 5:0
³ = 0:3 capital: 0.99 capital: 0.925 capital: 0.928
¾2
" = 0:4079 bequests: 0.723 bequests: 0.695 bequests: 0.743
³ = 0:4 capital: 0.952 capital: 0.921 capital: 0.908
¾2
" = 0:392 bequests: 0.651 bequests: 0.675 bequests: 0.712
³ = 0:5 capital: 0.929 capital: 0.884 capital: 0.878
¾2
" = 0:3704 bequests: 0.577 bequests: 0.602 bequests: 0.648
Table 19: Capital and Bequests [No Earnings Shock]
¾ = 3:0 ¾ = 4:0 ¾ = 5:0
³ = 0:3 capital: 0.929 capital: 0.933 capital: 0.898
¾2
" = 0:4079 bequests: 0.981 bequests: 1.017 bequests: 0.979
³ = 0:4 capital: 0.952 capital: 0.933 capital: 0.903
¾2
" = 0:392 bequests: 1.009 bequests: 1.004 bequests: 0.986
³ = 0:5 capital: 0.962 capital: 0.919 capital: 0.896
¾2
" = 0:3704 bequests: 0.999 bequests: 0.983 bequests: 0.975
economy. In contrast, the eﬀect on consumption inequality is ambiguous, declining when ¾ = 3:0 and 4:0 but
rising when ¾ = 5:0, and the rates of change are very small. Rates of decrease of wealth and bequests inequalities
are larger when the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ¾ is higher, except for proportions of households without
wealth or bequests. The rates of decline are greater when the correlation coeﬃcient of the earnings shock process
³ is smaller.
6.5.3 Robustness of Results on Aggregate Capital and Bequests accumulation
Finally, robustness is checked with respect to rates of change in aggregate capital and bequests of the three
hypothetical economies in comparison to the baseline economy. Table 18 presents aggregate capital and bequests
in the economy with complete annuity markets in all the nine cases. As before, the values are normalized so that
capital and bequests in the baseline economy are equal to 1 for each parameterization. In all the cases, both
capital and bequests decrease with the latter decreasing to a greater extent. When the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion ¾ is higher, the decrease in capital is greater and the decrease in bequests is smaller, except for
one case. The decreases are larger when the correlation coeﬃcient of the earnings shock process ³ is higher.
The rate of capital decline ranges from 1:0%, when ¾ = 3:0 and ³ = 0:3, to 12:2%, when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:5,
while the rate of bequests decline ranges from 25:7%, when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:3, to 42:3%, when ¾ = 3:0 and
³ = 0:5:
Table 19 shows capital and bequests in the economy without earnings uncertainty. Aggregate capital declines
in all the cases, while bequests decrease in six cases and increase in three cases. Capital decreases more and
bequests are more likely to decline when ¾ is greater except when ¾ = 4:0 and ³ = 0:3. As for ³, there are no
such clear-cut tendency. The rate of capital decline ranges from 3:8%, when ¾ = 3:0 and ³ = 0:5, to 10:4%,
when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:5, while the rate of bequests decline ranges from ¡1:7%, when ¾ = 4:0 and ³ = 0:3, to
32Table 20: Capital and Bequests [No Altruism]
¾ = 3:0 ¾ = 4:0 ¾ = 5:0
³ = 0:3 capital: 0.841 capital: 0.759 capital: 0.700
¾2
" = 0:4079 bequests: 0.717 bequests: 0.617 bequests: 0.549
³ = 0:4 capital: 0.865 capital: 0.796 capital: 0.726
¾2
" = 0:392 bequests: 0.756 bequests: 0.667 bequests: 0.586
³ = 0:5 capital: 0.901 capital: 0.836 capital: 0.761
¾2
" = 0:3704 bequests: 0.815 bequests: 0.726 bequests: 0.628
2:5%, when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:5:
Lastly Table 20 presents capital and bequests in the economy without altruism. Under every parameteri-
zation, both capital and bequests decline greatly, and the declines are larger when ¾ is larger and ³ is smaller.
The rate of capital decline ranges from 9:9%, when ¾ = 3:0 and ³ = 0:5, to 30:0%, when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:3,
while the rate of bequests decline ranges from 18:5%, when ¾ = 3:0 and ³ = 0:5, to 45:1%, when ¾ = 5:0 and
³ = 0:3:
Comparisons of the three hypothetical economies show that capital decline is always largest in the economy
without altruism and bequests decline is always smallest in the economy without earnings uncertainty. Other
rankings depend on parameter values, but in 6 out of the 9 cases, capital decline is larger in the economy with
complete annuity markets than in the economy without earnings uncertainty, and again in 6 out of the 9 cases,
bequests decline is larger in the economy without altruism than in the economy with complete annuity markets.
Diﬀerences in the rates of change of aggregate capital among the three economies are smallest when ¾ = 3:0
and ³ = 0:5 and largest when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:3, while diﬀerences in the rates of change of bequests are
smallest when ¾ = 3:0 and ³ = 0:3 and largest when ¾ = 5:0 and ³ = 0:3 or when ¾ = 3:0 and ³ = 0:5.
7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the quantitative importance of diﬀerent savings motives on the distributions of
wealth and consumption and aggregate capital accumulation by solving an overlapping generations model with
intra-generation heterogeneity. Agents diﬀer in age, ability, earnings shocks, and inherited bequests. In the
baseline economy there are uninsurable idiosyncratic risks associated with uncertain lifetime and the earnings
shocks. The model’s parameter values have been chosen so that the simulated earnings and wealth distributions
of the baseline economy match those observed in the U.S. data.
The allocations of the baseline economy have been compared with those of an economy with complete
annuity markets, an economy without earnings uncertainty, and an economy without altruism. The numerical
experiments have shown that diﬀerent savings motives seem to aﬀect savings behaviors of the heterogeneous
population unevenly, hence their eﬀects on the distributions and capital accumulation are dissimilar. The eﬀect
of completing annuity markets is dominantly on the old population and results in a large increase in wealth and
bequests inequalities through higher concentration of assets in the upper tail of the distribution. The results
33follow because poor people try to annuitize most of their wealth if such annuity securities are available. It also
results in an increase in consumption inequality, though the rate of increase is smaller. Alternatively, taking
out earnings uncertainty decreases savings by the young population, especially those in low income groups,
but lowers wealth inequality for the whole population because of the equalized lifetime earnings. Moreover, it
improves the distribution of consumption signiﬁcantly. Finally, the disappearance of altruism aﬀects mainly
savings behaviors of the old and rich population, and reduces wealth and bequests inequalities signiﬁcantly by
lowering the concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution. However, it only slightly improves the
distribution of consumption. Quantitatively, altruism seems to be most important in explaining the distribution
of wealth, while the absence of insurance markets for earnings uncertainty appears to have greatest signiﬁcance
in determining the distribution of consumption.
The comparisons of aggregate capital and bequests in the three hypothetical economies with those in the
baseline economy suggest that, aside from the pure life-cycle motive of savings, altruism is the most important
factor aﬀecting aggregate capital and bequests accumulation. Secondly in order of importance, especially
in explaining aggregate bequests, is the absence of annuity markets that generate accidental bequests. The
absence of insurance markets for earnings uncertainty, which generates precautionary savings among the working
population, seems to have least signiﬁcance, in particular, in explaining bequests accumulation.
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8 Appendix : Computational Algorithms
8.1 Algorithm to Compute the Steady State Distribution
Step 1: Enter the j th iteration with a guess for the real interest rate rj; and the wage rate wj. Also set
the interval for assets to be [0;amax].
Step 2 (Solving the Dynamic Programming Problem): Solve the problem backwards starting from
the problem at age 11.
2–1 (Old Adult’s Problem): Given the prices, solve the old adult’s maximization problem (22) at age
11 and obtain the value function J11¡
l;a;S
¢








and the corresponding decision rules. Continuing in this way, solve the maximization problems up
to age 7. The solution of the problem at age 7 gives the value function J7¡
l;a;S
¢
and the associated decision
rules.
2–2 (Problem at Age 6):




maximization problem (20) and obtain the value function W6¡
µ;´;l;a;S
¢
and the associated decision rules.
(b) When the parent has just died: Given the value function, solve the maximization problem (21) and
obtain the value function e V 6¡
µ;´;l;a;sp;S
¢
and the decision rules.
2–3 (Young Adult’s Problem):
(a)When the parent died before the previous period: Given Wj+1¡
µ;´;l;a;S
¢
(1 · j · 5); solve the problem
(19) and obtain Wj¡
µ;´;l;a;S
¢
and the corresponding decision rules.
37(b)When the parent has just died: Given Wj+1¡
µ;´;l;a;S
¢




and the decision rules.
(c)When the parent is alive: Given e V j+1¡
µ;´;l;a;sp;S
¢
(0 · j · 5) and V j+1¡
µ;´;l;a;sp;S
¢
(0 · j · 4);
solve the problem (9) and obtain V j¡
µ;´;l;a;sp;S
¢
and the decision rules.
Step 3 (Monte Carlo Simulation): Pick an initial child-parent pair, who are at age 0 and age 6,
respectively. Starting from this pair, perform a Monte Carlo simulation for one lineage based on the decision rules
computed above. Continue the simulation for large enough numbers of generations. Based on the simulation,
obtain the distribution of assets and eﬃciency labor. Since the model has an ergodic property, the computed
distribution remains the same if the simulation is performed for many diﬀerent lineages. See the next subsection
for detailed procedures.
Step 4 (Adjustment of the interval for assets): Check if the distribution of assets does not have a large
mass at the maximum level of assets, amax. If it has, increase the value of amax and resolve the maximization
problems and redo the Monte Carlo simulation (Go back to Step 2).
Step 5 (Update of the prices and the convergence check ): Based on the distributions of the state
variables, compute aggregate capital kj and eﬃciency labor lj. Substituting these values into the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-
order conditions, obtain the implied real interest rate rj and wage rate wj. Stop if the price diﬀerences from
the last iteration are small enough. If not, go back to Step 1 with new guesses for the prices. For the updated
prices, the weighted averages of the currently used prices and the newly computed prices might be used.
8.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
Step 1 (Initial states of the initial child-parent pair): Start the simulation with the initial child-parent
pair, whose ages are 0 and 6, respectively. Their initial states must be set.
Assume that the parent of the age 6 adult’s parent is dead before the previous period. Then the age 6 adult’s
state variables are the only information needed to solve his maximization problem (20). His initial assets level
a6
¡1and average labor productivity l
6
¡1 are set arbitrary,32 and the variables µ¡1 and ´6
¡1 are drawn randomly
from the underlying (unconditional) distributions. Based on the initial state variables, the decision rules for his
current consumption and next period’s assets holdings, a7
¡1, and the transition rules for his state variables are
determined.
The state variables of the young adult are the ones needed to solve the problem (9). His initial asset level a0
0
is set to be zero, the variables µ0 and ´0
0 are drawn randomly from the underlying (unconditional) distributions,
and the average labor productivity l
0
0 is set to be µ0´0
0Á(0): Since he is assumed to make decisions after observing




The parental state is needed to predict possible bequests receipt. Based on the initial state variables, the
decision rules for his consumption and assets a1
0, and the transition rules for the states are determined.
32The subscript is an index for generation and the superscript is an index for age. The child’s generation and the parent’s
generation are denoted generation 0 and generation -1, respectively.
38Step 2 (Determination of the initial old adult’s living status): Since the old adult faces a positive
death probability, his living status for the next period must be determined. His living status is set based on
the survival probability. If he dies when turning age 7, the amount of bequest left to the young adult is equal
to a7
¡1.
Step 3 (Initial young adult before age 6 and his parent): One period has passed. If the old adult




¡1; the decision rules and the transition rules for his states are set.
If the old parent is still alive, the young adult solves the same problem as in the previous period. If not,
he receives bequest a7
¡1 and solves the problem (17). The value of À1
0 is drawn randomly from the underlying
unconditional distribution, which together with the stochastic process (13) determines ´1
0. His new average
labor productivity l
1
0 is determined based on (12). The other state variables are set as in the previous period.
Given his states, the decision rules and the transition rules for the states are determined. A similar process is
continued until the young adult reaches age 6.
Step 4 (Initial young adult after age 6 and his child): Now the young adult is at age 6. At this
age, he has a child (age 0) and his parent is already dead. He solves the problem (20) if his parent died before
this period and solves the problem (21) if his parent has just died. His child’s initial state variables must be
set. The initial value for assets a0
2 is zero, the variable ´0
2 is drawn randomly from the underlying unconditional
distribution, and the initial ability µ
0
2 must be determined based on the parent’s ability µ
0
1 and the stochastic





2: The new age 0 individual solves
the problem (9).
Step 5 (Remaining generations): Step 3 and Step 4 are repeated for a large enough number of gen-
erations, say 150,000 generations. The state variables of the ﬁrst 15,000 generations are discarded in order to
remove eﬀects of initial conditions, and by using the variables for the remaining generations, the distributions
of the states over the population are computed.
39